In recent years, the techniques of hacking secured microprocessor integrated circuits (microprocessors, microcontrollers, microprocessor memories, coprocessor integrated circuits, etc.) have developed considerably. The most advanced hacking methods currently involve injecting errors at determined points of an integrated circuit during the execution of so-called sensitive operations, such as authentication operations or operations of executing a cryptography algorithm for example. Such attacks by error injection also referred to as attacks by fault injection enable, in combination with mathematical models, the structure of a hard-wired logic cryptography algorithm and/or the secret keys it uses to be deduced. The error injection can be done in various ways, by introducing glitches into the supply voltage of the integrated circuit, by introducing glitches into the clock signal of the integrated circuit, by exposing the integrated circuit to radiations or to a laser beam, etc.
One known method disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2004/052110 involves conducting integrity checks on the content of the memory, when starting the integrated circuit or during the course of its operation for example. However, these checks do not detect attacks that do not change the content of the memory, but which aim to change the data at the moment they are read in the memory, i.e., on the memory read path.